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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA ANN FARLEY, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
v. 
ROSS E. FARLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Civil No. 
10567 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is of the opinion that the statement of 
facts as related by the defendant-appellant is extremely 
incomplete and unilateral in presentment and in order 
for the court to have all the facts, we will relate them as 
follows: 
The parties were married at Reno, Nevada, September 
9, 1947. In 1949, following a short residence in Texas 
where their first child was born, the parties moved to 
Salt Lake City, Utah, where they purchased a home and 
appellant engaged in business. Their second child was 
born in Salt Lake City in December, 1949. At the time 
of the divorce hearing appellant was the owner and 
operator of three business entities, all located in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The parties lived continuously in Utah from 
1949 until shortly after their divorce. 
Divorce Action In Utah 
On October 3, 1958, Judge Aldon J. Anderson of 
the Third Judicial District, State of Utah issued a divorce 
after finding the appellant guilty of extreme cruelty, and 
awarded custody rights to the respondent with visitation 
rights to appellant. With respect to the property and the 
maintenance of respondent and the children, the court 
found that respondent's enterprises gave him an earning 
capacity of $8,550.00 per year, awarded all business assets 
to the appellant and ordered him to pay $200 per month 
child support and $175.00 per month alimony. The pro-
ceeds of the sale of the family residence in Salt Lake City 
were divided equally between the pairtie1s; reslpondent 
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was award what remained of the household furniture; 
appellant received the family automobile. Savings in the 
form of insurance on appellant's life were confirmed to 
appellant "leaving to his discretion the beneficiaries there-
of, with the admonition, nevertheless, to keep in mind 
his said children as said beneficiaries." Finally the court 
fo11nd it fair and equitable that the land in California be 
divided in kind, one-half to remain the property of 
U])pellant and one-half to be conveyed by appellant to 
respondent, in tJ'ust, for the use and benefit of the child-
ren. 
The original decree provided, paragraph 7 and 
8 thereof, that appellant convey the south 1/2 of 
lots 1 and 3, block 16, of Fair Oaks tract, consisting 
of approximately 20 1/2 acres of certain California 
property to the respondent in trust for the children 
to cover their support and education during their 
minority. The respondent to convey the property 
or balance thereof remaining to the children when 
the youngest attains or would have attained the 
age of 18. (R. 68) 
Appell,ant moved thereafter for modification of the 
divorce decree. 
Following entry of the decree on October 3, 1958, 
appellant moved the court to modify the original decree 
and to substitute the north one-half instead of the south 
one-half. The result was an order under date of December 
17, 1958 which modified the decree of October 3, 1958, 
substituting the north one-half for the south one-half. 
All other portions of the decree were affirmed. (R. 73, 74) 
Events fallowing the divorce decree. 
1. The appellant refused to convey said California 
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real property as ordered by the court and was ordered 
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of 
court. (R. 78) The appellant thereafter on the 23rd day 
of February, 1961 was held in contempt of Court. (R. 95) 
2. The appellant refused to pay alimony and child 
support payments as ordered and as of the 3rd day of 
January 1961, past due alimony and child support totaled 
the sum of $5,425. (R. 81) 
3. The appellant attempted to circumvent and thwart 
lawful court orders by purportedly disposing of his Utah 
business interests to one M. R. Morrison of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, who thereafter immediately sold said business 
interests to the Industrial Real Estate and Finance Co., 
for the amount of $61,296.73. (R. 93) 
4. The appellant was held to be in contempt of the 
court by reason of his failure to pay alimony and support 
money as ordered. (R. 93) 
5. A receiver was appointed by the court on February 
23, 1961 to insure the respondent's receipt of alimony 
and support payments ordered to be paid and to receive 
and disburse payments from the sale of the business 
interests of the appellant. (R. 97) 
Other important facts concerning the Utah decree. 
1. The appellant was present throughout the trial 
and was represented by legal counsel. The appellant had 
an opportunity to appeal the trial court's decision but the 
appellant did not appeal. (R. 57) 
2. The appellant following the qivorce decree re· 
quested the court to substitute the north half for the 
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:->onth half which was granted. Thus further substantiating 
tllc fact that it \Vas the appellant who requested the trial 
nrnrt to transfer the California property in trust for his 
minor children . 
3. The court recalled that it was the determination 
of the court on October 3, 1958 the date of the original 
divorce decree, to award to the respondent one-half of 
said California real property as her separate property 
rmd that the provision for award to the respondent was 
so intended. (R. 201) 
"The court checked its memory with Mr. 
Gustin and Mr. Baldwin, former attorneys for the 
plaintiff and defendant respectively, and the court 
feels correct that this suggestion to award the 
property to the respondent in trust for the minor 
children did not come from the court, but came 
from counsel. That was a provision of the divorce 
decree that was reached after consultation with 
counsel and was not a provision reached individually 
by the court. The court points out that Mr. Farley 
was before the court physically and concurred in 
the prnperty division and the restrictions which 
were placed upon the property intended to be award-
ed to Mrs. Farley, the plaintiff (respondent) and 
ivere placed there at his (appellant) request to 
insure the use of the property for the benefit of the 
minor children." (R. 201) 
Subsequent to the issuance of the decree of October 
3 1958 both of the parties moved to the state of California. 
' ' On June 18, 1959, the Respondent filed an action in the 
Superior Court of the state of California in and for the 
county of Sacramento seeking to do the following: 
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"For an order and decree declaring and ad-
judging that Plaintiff, as trustee for Ross Edward 
Farley, II and Barbara Susanne Farley, is the owner 
of said real property described in said order modi-
fying decree dated December 17, 1958, and described 
in paragraph V of plaintiff's first stated Cause of 
Action and that Defendants, or any of them, have 
no right, title, estate or interest whatever in or to 
said real property, and that Def end ants, and all oi 
them, be forever debarred from asserting any claim 
whatsoever in or to said real property adverse to 
the Plaintiff" (Page 7 of Ex. D-5). 
In effect to quiet title in herself as trustee. 
On August 11, 1959, Appellant filed an action in the 
same California court seeking the following: 
1. To quiet title to the same California property which 
is here in dispute (see page 82 Ex. D-5) 
2. To reduce alinwny and child support paynients 
Provided by the Utah Court (see page 37 of Ex. D-5). 
The California trial court confirmed the divorce decree 
with the exception of paragraphs 7 and 8, which provided 
for the trust as described above and quieted Appellant's 
title in the real property subject to a lien upon said real 
property for alimony and child support (See Ex. G). This 
decree was in turn appealed to the District Court of 
Appeal in and for the Third Appellate District for the 
State of California. The opinion of the California appellate 
court is included as EX. B in the Record and might be 
summarized as follows: 
(a) The conveyance of the real property in trust, 
during the minority of the children, was properly within 
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the Utah Court's jurisdiction and could not be collaterally 
atlacked in the Courts of California. 
(b) The further provision in the Utah decree which 
provided that upon the children's reaching their majority, 
the property would be distributed to them, was beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court and was thus subject to 
collateral attack in the State of California. In this regard, 
the Court noted : 
"We conclude that the award (Judge Ander-
son's October, 1958 Decree) exceeds the jurisdiction 
of the Utah Court to the extent that it decrees 
transfer of property or money to the children when 
they reach adulthood. The lack of jurisdiction ap-
pears on the face of the Utah decree." 
The final portion of the California decision concluded: 
"\Ve conclude that the Utah decree, so far as 
it directed conveyance of the land, its proceeds or 
income, to the Defendant's children upon their 
reaching adulthood, exceeds the jurisdiotion of the 
Utah court, that it is vulnerable to collateral attack 
in Utah and not entitled to full faith and credit in 
California" (See pp. 6 and 10 of Ex. D-4). 
In accordance with the appellate court's decision, the 
California trial court, upon remand of the case, issued a 
modified decr~e ~nd judg<r.cnt which provided in essence 
that the Appellant must forthwith convey the real property 
in trust to the Respondent for the benefit of the minor 
children during their minority. Appellant executed such a 
deed on May 28, 1965 (Ex. D-11). The decree also provided 
that after the children had reached their majority (in 
December of 1967), the trust should terminate and the 
Hespondent should reconvey the property, or its remaining 
proceeds to the Appellant as his sole and separate property 
(See Ex. D-12). 
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The net effect of the California litigation, therefore, 
was simply to grant a vested remainder in the trust 
property to the Appellant, after the children had reached 
their majority. 
Subsequent Utah Litigation. 
It should be noted that it was the Appellant and not 
the Respondent who returned to the Utah field of battle. 
The Appellant, Mr. Farley having iu~lfully refused to 
comply with lawful court orders issued by the Utah Court 
still requested on March 11, 1965 for the Utah Court to 
give full faith and credit to the California Courts and to 
reduce alimony payments from $175 to $100. ( R. 156) 
The Utah court, after a hearing held on March 18, 
1965, gave full faith and credit to the California decree 
and accordingly on the 22nd day of March, 1965 reduced 
Appellant's alimony payments from $175 to $100. (R. 177) 
The respondent in response to appellant's motion 
and notice requested the court also on March 11th 1965 
to modify its original decree (R. 164) and to award to 
the respondent as her separate property the north one-half 
of the California property. (R. 164) 
The respondent's motion to award the disputed one-
half of the California property to here self in fee simple 
was first heard together with the appellants motion to 
reduce alimony on March 18, 1965 (R. 166). Respondent's 
motion was then continued until April 16, 1958, at which 
time the district court heard further argument and re· 
ceived memorandums from both sides. The hearing was 
further continued to May 12, 1965 with direction for 
counsel for both sides to submit further memorandums 
8 
I 
) 
I 
} 
I 
I 
I 
and authorities and to examine the California transcript 
and records in order to determine whether the respon-
dent's motion had been submitted to the California courts 
an<l was therefore res judicata. (R. 190) The court con-
tinued the hearing again until June 18, 1965 for further 
argument. The court further considered the matter at a 
hearing held on January 5, 1966, where counsel for both 
sides again presented arguments. The outcome of the 
January 5th 1966 hearing was an order signed by Judge 
Aldon J. Anderson on the 27th day of January, 1966 
awarding the disputed one..:half of the California property 
to the respondent in fee simple as her separate property 
following the termination of the trust. (R. 205) The judge 
also concluded that as the trial judge at the time of the 
original hearing that was his intent and determination at 
that time and that he would then have s·o awarded the 
disputed property except for the appellant's request that 
the property be awarded in trust for his minor children. 
(R.201) 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER 
COURT 
After approximately one year, five hearings, four 
written memorandums ( 2 from each side), and several 
hours of oral argument Judge Aldon J. Anderson granted 
the one-half of the California property in dispute to the 
respondent in fee simple as her separate property. Order 
dated January 27, 1966, (R. 195, R. 200) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE NEVER CON-
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SIDERED A REQUEST THAT THE DISPUTIW 
ONE-HALF OF THE CALIFORNIA PROPERTY BR 
A WARDED TO THE RESPONDENT IN FEE AS 
HER SEPARATE PROPERTY. THE MATTER IS 
NOT RES JUDICATA. 
The appellant requested the California court for the 
following: 
1. Quiet title to the one-half of the California pro-
perty in dispute. (see page 87 D-5) 
2. Reduce child support to $35.00 per month ancl 
eliminate alimony payments. (see page 31 Ex. D-5) 
The respondent requested the California Court: 
1. To quiet title to the one-half of the California 
property in dispute in herself as trustee for the minor 
children. 
The Utah court considered a request that the disputed 
property be awarded to the respondent in fee as her 
separate property. 
The appellant now by s01ne magical and metamorphi-
cal nieans wants to convert a quiet title action into an 
adjudication of marital property rights. 
The sole question before the California courts was 
the question of the validity of the Utah decree. At no time 
did it consider a request that the disputed California 
property be granted to the respondent as her separate 
property. 
The Utah Court by its order of April 21, 1965 directed 
the appellant to produce evidence: 
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"Whether the California courts heard evidence 
and considered a request from the Plaintiff Barbara 
Ann Farley, to have that portion of the California 
property tr an sf erred in trust .. trans/ erred directly 
to her as her separate property." (R. 190) 
It is interesting to note that the appellant has produced 
110 evidence that the California courts considered that 
<1uestion in either of his two memorandums submitted to 
Judge Anderson. (see R. 182 and R. 209) The appellant 
claims that mere common sense compels the conclusion 
that a quiet title action is an action to litigate marital 
property rights. Common sense leads me to the conclusion 
that the guilty party to a marriage, one who has con-
sistently refused to show any good faith and who is in 
contempt of the Utah court should not becaus·e of legal 
maneuvers retain all marital property when the wife and 
tu.·o children have nothing. 
The Honorable, Aldon J. Anderson, carefully con-
sidered the problem of res judicata and requested the 
appellant to show evidence that the matter had been con-
sidered in California. The appellant was in possession of 
a complete transcript of the California trial court pro-
ceedings and all other records (supplied by the respondent) 
and the only argument advanced then and now was the 
argument that a quiet tit!e action ·was someho\V magically 
a litigation of the respondent's marital property rights. 
The California courts m~erely considered the validity 
of the Utah decree. 
It would appear that Judge Anderson correctly con-
cluded the matter had not been litigated in the California 
court and was not there/ ore res iudicata. 
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The full faith and credit clause is therefore not an 
issue and quite easily side stepped the matter entirely when 
courts were not disturbed by the full faith and credU 
issue and quite easily side steped the matter entirely when 
the respondent asked for enforcement of her Utah divorce 
decree. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AW ARD ING 
THE REAL PROPERTY HERE IN DISPUTE TO 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
SECTION 30-3-5. U.C.A. (1953) 
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND CHILDREN 
"When a decree of divorce is made the court 
may make such orders in relation to the children, 
property, and parties and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable : provided, 
that if any of the children have attained the age of 
ten years and are of sound mind, such children 
shall have the privilege of selecting the parent to 
which they will attach themselves. Such subsequent 
changes or new orders may be made by the court 
with respect to the disposal of the children or the 
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable 
and proper." 
This statute, which has existed in substantially the 
same language since 1888, constitutes the entire statutory 
law of Utah on the subject of the powers and duties of the 
chancellor in rendering a divorce decree. 
The leading case of MURPHY v. MOYLE, 17 Utah 
113, 53 Pac 1010, cited by the California Appellant Court, 
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interpretes the above statute as a broad grant of discretion 
to both the trial and appellate courts of Utah to make 
such orders with respect to the property of the parties and 
their furture support as are dictated by equitable con-
siderations. See also Matei v. Mattei, 12 Utah 2nd 116, 363 
T'ar. 2d 779. 
Murphy v. Moyle, cited above states: 
"This statute is broad and comprehensive. 
Under it the Court has power to make such a decree 
if the circumstances may warrant, and doubtless, 
if there is danger of the father squandering the 
estate, or if, from hostility or other cause, he is 
likely to refuse maintenance to his wife, or support 
to his children awarded to her, and thus leave the 
children to be supported by the mother without the 
aid from his estate, the court may make such order 
respecting the property and the support and main-
tenance of the wife and children, as is just and 
equitable, and such order or decree may be made to 
continue in force after his decease; and the court 
may afterwards, if occasion shall require it, make 
such change in any decrees as will be conducive to 
the best interests of all parties concerned." 
A more recent expression of the interpretation placed 
upon this statute is found in the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Crocker in Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 
8,12 Pac. 2d 103. 
Page 242 
"In regard to these matters the court is en-
dowed with powers over property and persons far 
broader than in any other type of civil action. It 
may make such disposition of the property and 
impose such controls upon their persons as it deems 
necessary for their welfare." 
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The last sentence of Section 30-3-5 -
"RETAINS JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE DECREE, 
INCLUDING THE PROPERTY DIVISION ASPECT 
THEREOF, UPON A SHOWING OF CHANGED CIR-
CUMSTANCES." 
See also Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 Pac. 2d 
1211 wherein the court provided that changes could be 
made regarding the property division upon a showing of 
changed circumstances. 
If circumstances warrant, to secure future support 
the court may impress a lien upon the husband's property 
(Murphy v. Moyle, supra), or require that the awarded 
property be held in trust, (Doe v. Doe 48 Utah 200, 213, 
158 Pac. 781.) 
Pursuant to the grant of jurisdiction, divorce courts 
in Utah customarily award the wife at least one third of 
the husband's estate, Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 109; 
55 Pac. 84; Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 Pac. 2d 
743. 
Appellant's arguments summarize. 
(a) The California property in dispute was not part 
of the original property settlement and therefore there 
can be no modification (page 14 appellant's brief) 
(b) Section 30-3-5. UCA allows the modification of 
a property settlement in only the most extreme and 
unusual circumstances. (page 16 appellant's brief) 
Basically the cases cited by the appellant are the 
same cases cited by respondent but the appellant draws 
different conclusions. 
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As to point (a) the appellant CONTRADICTS HIM-
SELF on page H he argues the disputed California pro-
perty was not part of the property settlement and then 
he cites Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d 
914 (1953) where he states the court was faced with an 
identical problem to that here: "Whether or not a pro-
perty settlement incorporated in a divorce decree can be 
subsequently modified." 
See the original decree dated October 3, 1958, (R. 65) 
the modifying order of the original decree dated 16th day 
of December, 1958. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of law connected therewith, and the Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 201) where in all cases the court 
discusses in detail the marital property and provides for 
distribution of the property. It v,rould appear that the 
facts and pleadings clearly show the disputed property to 
!Je part of the property settlement. In all cases it is listed 
as part of the marital property. 
Point ( b) A property settlenient may be modified 
only in the most extreme and unusual circumstances and 
the appellant concludes they do not exist here. (appellant's 
brief page 16) 
The record shows: 
(A) The appellant was the guilty party in the 
marriage. ( R. 65) 
(B) Held in contempt of court for failing to pay 
alimony and child support. At times the amount in 
arrears exceeded $5,000 dollars. (R. 93) (R. 81) 
( C) Attempted to dispose of his business interests 
for an amount in excess of $61,000 in such a way 
as to avoid child support and alimony payments 
(R. 93) 
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( D) Held in contempt of court for refusing to 
convey the disputed one-half of the California 
property to respondent in trust. ( R. 93) 
(E) Appellant physically in court throughout the 
divorce proceedings and represented by counsel. 
The appellant requested the court to award one-
half of the California property to the respondent 
in trust for the rninor children. (R. 57) (R. 201) 
(F) The appellant has displayed throughout a 
complete disregard for lawful court orders and 
contempt for the court. ( R. 93) 
( G) The respondent and her two children have 
shared in no marital property except approximately 
$1,756 from the sale of the personal residence 
(R. 60) and the household furniture. (R. 60) 
(H) Appellant has attempted to eleminate alimony 
payments and reduce child support payments to 
$35 per child. 
(I) The appellant went "shopping" to the California 
courts for a better decision after requesting the 
Utah courts to do what it did. (R. 201) (page 87 
D-5) 
(J) The California property consisting of 41 acres 
at Fair Oakes, Sacramento, is believed to have a 
value of approximately $5,000 per acre, total ap-
proximate value $200,000 (minimum). 
To summarize: the guilty party to the marriage by 
legal maneuvers and court shopping has managed to 
receive all of the marital property, while displaying a 
contempt and a wilful intent to refuse to pay alimony and 
support payments. What future financial protection will 
this family have or receive from the appellant? 
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The respondent believes that extreme and unusual 
circurnstances e:i.:iS't here and that the Utah courts have 
been thwarted in their attempt to provide for a fair, 
equitable, just settlement of marital property by the 
appellant's contemptuous conduct and "court shopping" 
tactics. 
POINT III. 
CALIFORNIA LAW SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED 
BY UTAH IN PROVIDING FOR A MARITAL PRO-
PERTY SETTLEMENT OR MODIFICATION 
THEREOF. 
Even the California Courts would not agree with 
appellants argument (appellant's brief page 26) that the 
conflicts of law rule provides that the situs of the real 
property must be followed even in divorce actions. 
The opinion of the District Court of Appeal of the 
State of California, in and for the Third Appellant District, 
(Ex. D-4 page 4, 5) states: 
"In the present case both husband and wife 
were bona fide residents of Utah and both fully 
participated in the Utah action. Thus the courts 
of that state had fundamental jurisdiction over the 
parties' martial status and their persons. (Sherrer 
V. Sherrer, supra, 334 U.S. at pp. 350-351, Williams 
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-230; Crouch 
v. Crouch, 28 Cal 2nd 243, 249 - 250; Rest., Conflicts 
of Laws, sec. 110; Rest., Judgments, secs. 16, 33.) 
The husband cannot now question Utah's juri,sdiction 
over the subject matter and parties. 
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"Utah is not a community property state. In 
dividing assets between a divorcing husband and 
wife, Utah courts niay award property acquired 
before converture. (Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255 
(67 P. 2d 265, 267). Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, empowers a divorce court to 
"make such orders in relation to the children, pro-
perty and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable." Utah 
statutes characterize this statute as broad and 
comprehensive, authorizing such decree as the cir-
cumstances may warrant, including provisions for 
the support of children during their minority. 
(Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113 (53 Pac. 1010, 
1012) ; see also Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2nd 34 
(261 p. 2d 944.) The Murphy decision specifically 
upholds a decree directing S'ale of the husband's land 
and deposit of the proceeds with the court clerk 
with directions to pay the wife a fixed monthly 
sum for support of the minor children. In order to 
insure payment of future alimony (and inferentially 
to secure support of minor children), a husband 
may be enjoined from disposing of his property. 
(Anderson v. Anderson, 54 Utah 309 (181 Pac. 168.) 
The California Court would permit Utah to apply 
Utah law in divorce actions as the above shows assuming 
Utah to have jurisdiction over the parties. In Utah the 
law provides for continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions. 
It should also be remembered that the appellant returned 
to the Utah field of battle in order to have alimony reduced 
from $175 per month to $100 per rnonth. In response to 
that petition the respondent requested that the disputed 
one-half of the California real property be awarded to her 
as her separate property. 
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The broad conflict of law rule cited by the appellant 
does not here apply. Utah has jurisdiction over the parties 
and subject matter and may apply Utah law in divorce 
matters or subsequent modifications. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
SUBSEQUENT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN ORDER TO·PROVIDE 
FOR MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL DIV-
ORCE DECREE. 
The appellant (appellant's brief page 23) argues that 
the trial court must modify a previous decree only upon 
r1 showing of change in circumstances. 
The appellant by this argument hopes to provide for 
"judicial blindness" and to preclude the Utah Courts from 
giving judicial recognition to actions by the California 
Courts nullifying the decree of the Utah Courts. 
Nothing is taken from the appellant and nothing has 
been changed. The appellant agreed and in fact requested 
the Utah Court to award the one-half of the California 
property to the respondent in trust for the minor children, 
(R. 201) then fled to California to shop for a better forum 
and tdle to the property has been in dispute ever since. 
As the California Court so effectively argues (D-4) 
page 9) 
"Under the particular facts here defendent's 
failure to appel (in Utah) does not bar him. (In 
California). Mrs. Farley suffered no change of 
position as a result of that failure." (page 9 D-4) 
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Title to the one-half portion of the California pro-
perty has always been in dispute. The modification order 
in no way changes the amount to be distributed to Mr. 
Farley under the terms of the divorce decree. (R. 65) 
The modification order merely does what was origin-
ally intended to be done and to permit a equitable, fair, 
settlement of marital property. (R. 65, R. 201) Mr. Farley 
under the terms of the original decree received one-half 
of all marital real property in addition he was awarded 
as his separate property his business and life insurance 
policies. The modification decree does not decreas'e the 
amount Mr. Farley was to receive under the terms of the 
original decree in any way. 
The modification order merely carries out the intent 
of the trial judge to make a fair equitable settlement of 
marital property. 
Mr. Farley's position has not been changed his share 
of marital property has not been reduced. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND RES-
PONDENT'S MOTION SHOULD NOT BE 
DISMISSED ON TH~ GROUND OF FORUM NON 
CONVENIENS. 
The appellant, Mr. Farley, voluntarily returned to the 
Utah battle field. He voluntarily filed on March 11th 1965 
a motion to reduce alimony payments from $175 dollars 
per month to $100 per month. (R. 155) A hearing was 
held on March 18th, 1965 and an order signed by the 
Court on March 22, 1965 wherein alimony was reduced 
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from $175 dollars per month to $100 dollars per month. 
(R. 177) 
The respondent properly noticed and motioned, the 
Court in response to appellants motion that the one-half 
portion of the California property in dispute be awarded 
to her as her separate property. The first hearing on 
respondent's motion was held on March 18, 1965, the same 
date aS' appellant's motion to reduce alimony. (R. 166) The 
respondent's motion was finally decided in her favor on 
January 22, 1966. 
The respondent respectfully points out to the Court 
that the appellant returned to the Utah battle field voluntar-
ily as a result of his own nwtion and having succeeded in 
striking his blow dances around the ring and cries forum 
non conveniens. 
I can but you can't 
For me it's convenient 
For you - forum non conveniens. 
Certainly the State of Utah and its judiciary should 
be concerned with this action, in order to prevent a grave 
miscarriage of justice. Utah attempted to provide a fair, 
equitable settlement of marital property, yet by legal 
maneuvers, wilful disregard and contemptuous conduct 
the appellant, the guilty party to the marriage, retained 
all marital property, while the respondent and her two 
minor children fought to obtain alimony and child support. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant relies heavily on the case of Smith v. 
Smith, 77 Utah 60, 68, 291 Pac. 298 (1930). It is cited on 
page 9, 10, 12 and 20 (appellant's brief) and also in his 
l'onclusion. The Smith case involves a North Dakota divorce 
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where the property rights were completely litigated in 
North Dakota. 
The present case involves a Utah divorce frustrated 
by the appellant and a voluntary return to Utah by both 
parties to request Utah, the jurisdiction of the divorce, 
to provide for a fair, equitable, just, division of marital 
property as the Court originally intended. The two cases 
clearly are not similar and the Smith case should not 
support appellant's arguments. 
The respondent respectfully requests this court to 
affirm carefully considered opinion of Judge Anderson and 
to permit a fair equitable division of marital property. 
If for any reason that cannot be accomplished res-
pondent respectfully requests the court to affirm para-
graph 9 of the order dated January 27, 1966 (R. 204) 
wherein it is provided: 
"If for any reason the conveyance of the 
North half of Lots 1 and 3, Block 16, Fair Oaks 
Tract, according to the official plat thereof filed 
in the office of the Recorder of Sacramento County, 
California, to the plaintiff is not permitted by the 
California Courts, then the defendent is hereby 
ordered to pay to the plaintiff a sum of money 
equal to the appraised value of the north one-half 
of said property, as of the date of October 3, 1958, 
the date of the original decree. If the parties 
cannot agree on an appraised value then the court 
shall appoint a competent real estate appraiser to 
determine the value of said property as of the 3rd 
day of October, 1958" (R. 204) 
Respectfully submitted, 
PA UL M. HANSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
817 Oak Dr. 
South Ogden, Utah 
22 
